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Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), also
known as the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), is a trade agreement
currently in negotiations between the United States and the European
Union.  Negotiations began on July 8, 2013,1 and are expected to end no
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1. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET: TRANSATLANTIC
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (T-TIP) (2013) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
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earlier than 2015.2  The agreement will ultimately attempt to remove barri-
ers to trade between the United States and EU in order to facilitate greater
trade and investment between the two entities.  If successful, TTIP will
become the largest free trade agreement in history.3  The United States and
EU have attempted to create a free trade agreement since the 1990s.4  How-
ever, the ongoing negotiations made in the present economic climate—
post-financial crisis of 2008— are the most likely to succeed, as both the
United States and EU hope to achieve structural trade liberalization that
will reduce trade frictions and increase investment.5
Both the United States and the European Union stand to realize great
benefits from the TTIP by adding jobs supported by current transatlantic
trade and by expanding upon the current total of nearly 3.7 trillion U.S.
dollars that both entities have invested in each other’s economies.6  The
EU’s estimated annual benefit to be realized from the TTIP is 0.9 % of
GDP, or 163 billion U.S. dollars; the United States is estimated to realize a
0.8% increase in GDP, or 132 billion U.S. dollars.7  Other studies suggest
much higher estimated per capita gains, from 5% for the EU to 13% for the
United States.8  Most of these projected gains are not from potential reduc-
tions in tariffs, as tariffs between the EU and the United States are already
low at an average of around 3%.9  Instead, most gains are expected to come
from a reduction in non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs).10  NTBs cause trade
friction that may lead to reduced trade and higher costs between parties to
a trade agreement.  NTBs mostly include regulatory barriers to trade
access, which can result from differences in regulations and exclusionary
rules.11  Eliminating these regulatory differences may result in two-thirds
to four-fifths of the estimated gains from a final, successful agreement.12
As a result of the potential impact of these regulatory differences, one
of the main goals of TTIP is to “significantly reduce the cost of differences
in regulations and standards by promoting greater compatibility, trans-
parency, and cooperation, while maintaining our high levels of health,
safety, and environmental protection.”13  Initial goals of both the United
2. EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY ASSOCIATION, TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PART-
NERSHIP (TTIP) UPDATE NO. 1, 1, 12 (2014) [hereinafter UPDATE].
3. Michael Beckerman, The Future of the Global Economy Depends on the U.S– E.U.
Trade Deal, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Jul. 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
michael-beckerman/the-future-of-the-global-_b_3562595.html.
4. Gabriel J. Felbermayr & Mario Larch, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP): Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives, 14 CESIFO FORUM 49, 49
(2013).
5. See id.
6. FACT SHEET, supra note 1.
7. GAVIN THOMPSON, THE LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE TRANSATLANTIC
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) 1 (2013).
8. Id. at 2.
9. See id. at 1, 3.
10. See Felbermyer & Larch, supra note 4, at 49.
11. See id. at 49– 50.
12. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP: THE
REGULATORY PART 1 (2013) [hereinafter THE REGULATORY PART].
13. FACT SHEET, supra note 1.
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States and the EU include working toward “regulatory coherence,” a con-
cept that looks to strike a balance between optimal regulation and maxi-
mum market freedom.14  The European Commission found several key
ways to achieve regulatory coherence: recognizing the similar effects of
seemingly different regulations, shifting current regulations to a mutually-
agreed upon middle ground, and cooperating on how to treat and enforce
highly-disparate regulations.15
Despite the rhetoric of regulatory coherence, the practical implications
of these negotiations will require much more political and industrial sacri-
fice than simple cooperation on regulatory schemes.  The EU has expressly
declared its refusal to compromise on some of its regulations; the European
Commission has stated, “We will not negotiate existing levels of protection
for the sake of an agreement.  Our high level of protection here in Europe is
non-negotiable . . . . There will be no compromise whatsoever on safety,
consumer protection or the environment.”16
Consistent with these assertions, analysts have already identified
likely areas of regulatory conflict.  One of the most salient obstacles to
successful negotiations arises from the disparities between U.S. and EU
approaches to food and safety regulations: the EU has long blocked U.S.
imports of genetically modified produce, chlorine-treated poultry, and
meat from animals treated with the growth stimulant ractopamine.17
These disparities are rooted in the different approaches that the United
States and EU take in creating regulatory schemes.  The EU blocks many
imports of American food products as a precautionary measure, even if the
products are regarded as safe elsewhere.18  This approach is in opposition
to the American regulatory principle of cost-benefit analysis.19  Despite
both American and European rhetoric supporting regulatory coherence,
both entities remain unwilling to compromise on these specific regulatory
standards.  In fact, the United States has registered formal complaints with
the World Trade Organization challenging the European Commission’s
refusal to approve chemically treated poultry products originating from the
14. NATIONAL CENTER FOR APEC & APEC BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL, STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY COHERENCE IN APEC: AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE DAIRY,
ELECTRONICS, AND OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLE INDUSTRIES 1 (2012), http://www.ncapec.org/
docs/Publications/Strategic%20Framework%20for%20Regulatory%20Coherence%20in
%20APEC.pdf.
15. THE REGULATORY PART, supra note 12, at 3.
16. European Commission Directorate– General for Trade, Questions and Answers
(TTIP), EUROPEAN COMMISSION: TRADE (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ttip/questions-and-answers [hereinafter Trade Policy].
17. Olga Khazan, Transatlantic Trade: How Chlorine– Washed Chicken Prevents
Greater U.S.– E.U. Trading, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/02/13/the-transatlantic-trading-partner-
ship-how-chlorine-washed-chicken-prevents-u-s-e-u-trade.
18. Id.
19. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), [hereinafter Exec.
Order].
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United States.20
As a result of these conflicts, the trade negotiations between the
United States and the EU will predominantly focus on reducing trade fric-
tion through the elimination of NTBs.  Although commentators argue that
regulatory coherence is an achievable goal based on mutual investment,
similar economic development levels, and cultural proximity,21 the domes-
tic regulatory schemes and policies of both entities create formidable
obstacles to successful negotiations.  Even if the negotiations overcome
these obstacles, any agreement that aims to achieve regulatory coherence
will have significant externalities impacting domestic economics and third-
party countries; however, these concerns, while important, may be over-
shadowed by the potential gains from an agreement.  An examination of
the differences in the basic regulatory principles of the United States and
the EU indicates the most likely origins of any potential regulatory coher-
ence.  The disparities between the regulatory schemes of the United States
and EU are a product of the fundamental differences between their respec-
tive regulatory foundations.  Successful trade liberalization depends, in
part, on the successful navigation of these fundamental differences in prin-
ciple.  Regulatory coherence in contentious industries can be best achieved
either through mutual recognition of substantively similar regulatory
schemes, or through reconciling cost-benefit analysis and the precaution-
ary principle into a modified cost-benefit analysis that combines the eco-
nomic considerations valued by the United States with the risk-aversion
approach prioritized by the EU.
This Note will proceed in four parts.  Part I explains the differences
between the basic regulatory principles of the United States and the EU.
Part II examines the functional outcomes of these differences in regulations
and the estimated cost impact of the NTBs resulting from these divergent
outcomes.  Part III evaluates the externalities of a successful agreement,
including effects on third-party nations, global trade, and concerns over
deregulation.  Lastly, Part IV submits that the two most effective methods
to reach regulatory convergence without compromising existing safety
standards are 1) reconciling the two regulatory principles by implementing
a modified cost-benefit analysis approach, or 2) achieving mutual recogni-
tion of substantively similar regulations.
I. The Formative Differences Between the Basic Regulatory Principles
of the United States and the European Union
Regulatory principles are methodologies for structuring regulations.
They provide frameworks for regulatory decision-making based on prede-
termined value judgments.  Regulatory methodologies include cost-benefit
analysis, also known as benefit-cost analysis; the precautionary principle;
20. European Communities –  Certain Measures Affecting Poultry and Poultry Meat
Products From the United States, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Feb.
24, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds389_e.htm.
21. See Felbermayr & Larch, supra note 4, at 59.
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multi-criteria analysis; holistic cost-benefit comparisons; and cost-effective-
ness analysis.22  These methodologies have overlapping considerations and
applications depending on different circumstances and levels of knowl-
edge.23  Choosing a particular regulatory principle generally entails the
prioritization of certain values over others.  For example, cost-benefit anal-
ysis prioritizes economic efficiencies and quantifiable benefits, whereas the
precautionary principle emphasizes safety and health concerns over eco-
nomic costs.24
The United States formally espouses cost-benefit analysis as its foun-
dational regulatory principle.25  In Executive Order 12866, President Clin-
ton directed that agencies base regulatory decisions on multiple factors,
including “both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose
or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits
of the intended regulation justify its costs.”26  Cost-benefit regulation
focuses on efficiencies in addition to risks.  As a result, this regulatory
principle requires quantifiable economic gains and net benefits.  The cost-
benefit analysis “acts as a filter, capturing inefficient regulations while
allowing efficient regulations to pass through.”27
Executive Order 12866 directs agencies to consider additional eco-
nomic factors in addition to monetary costs and benefits.28  The Order dic-
tates that agencies “shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct
regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the
desired behavior.”29  Additionally, regulatory design should also incorpo-
rate factors such as “incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability,
the costs of enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated
entities, and the public), flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity” and
“tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, including indi-
viduals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities.”30  Consequently,
the American regulatory scheme primarily values economic benefits.
American cost-benefit analysis assigns predetermined values to market fac-
tors and monetary costs and benefits.  Although risk is an important factor
to any regulatory principle, there are many other competing factors in the
United States regulatory scheme.
22. See FRANK ACKERMAN, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTE AT
TUFTS UNIVERSITY, CRITIQUE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
DECISION-MAKING: A REPORT TO FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ENGLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN
IRELAND 11 (2008), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/Ack_UK_CBAcritique.pdf.
23. See id.
24. DAVID VOGEL, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 9– 10 (2012).
25. Exec. Order, supra note 199. R
26. Id.
27. Daniel H. Cole, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Precautionary Principle,
PENN PROGRAM ON REGULATION: REG BLOG (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.regblog.org/2012/
03/reconciling-cost-benefit-analysis-with-the-precautionary-principle.html.
28. Exec. Order, supra note 9.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Criticisms of the cost-benefit principle focus on the difficulty of quan-
tifying many variables and the misleading nature of “perceived reliability”
derived from this quantitative data.31  Cost-benefit analysis may filter out
high-cost rules with large economic burdens, which may deter future
agency rulemaking on contentious issues.32  Additionally, many variables
that should factor into an effective analysis are hard to quantify, such as the
public-health benefits of cutting polluting emissions and the monetary
value of saving thirty lives per year.33  Common harms caused by pollu-
tants and other contentiously regulated industries often do not occur con-
temporaneously with the actual emission or first point of contact.34  The
quantification of highly unquantifiable factors such as the value of human
life often skews the computation of benefits and costs.35  For example,
many of the benefits of environmental regulation stem from the reduced
risk of death.36  These benefits are latent due to the delay between the
actual injury and the initial cause of injury.  Because these benefits are so
hard to measure and quantify, a cost-benefit analysis that overlooks these
factors may cause a proposed regulation to fail.  As a result of these varying
issues, the cost-benefit principle is a generally under-regulating methodol-
ogy.  Cost-benefit analysis favors risk-toleration and regulation that leads
to economic positives.
The European Union, on the other hand, formally espouses the use of
the precautionary principle.  Unlike the cost-benefit principle, the precau-
tionary principle applies when the EU presupposes potentially dangerous
effects of a product or process, or when scientific uncertainty exists.37  The
EU dictates that the policy concerns underlying the precautionary princi-
ple consist of three substantive elements: 1) stepping up the drive to boost
knowledge, 2) establishing scientific and technological monitoring
schemes to identify new knowledge and understand its implications, and
3) staging a wide-ranging social debate on what is desirable and what is
feasible.38  These principles focus on the availability and quality of scien-
tific knowledge.  The precautionary principle thus applies when existing
knowledge is insufficient.  The EU also stresses that precaution must be
distinguished from prevention.  Prevention applies to measurable, quantifi-
able risks, and it requires some way to assess these risks.  Precaution, on
the other hand, entails a level of regulation beyond prevention that may be
31. Gregory Mandel & James Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus the Precau-
tionary Principle: Beyond Cass Sunstein’s Laws of Fear, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037, 1052
(2006).
32. See Cole, supra note 277. R
33. Cass R. Sunstein, The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERG VIEW
COLUMNS (Sep. 12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-12/the-stunning-
triumph-of-cost-benefit-analysis.html.
34. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Dis-
counting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 941 (1999).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 943.
37. 2000 O.J. (268) 9 [hereinafter O.J.].
38. Id. at 7.
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applied when there is insufficient knowledge concerning the risk.39
The precautionary principle’s concern with insufficient knowledge
and lack of scientific certainty, combined with the EU’s cautious approach
to quantitative regulation, lead to a generally higher level of regulation and
aversion to risk.40  Regulatory decisions involving any uncertainties favor
regulation and risk reduction.  Unlike cost-benefit analysis, cost considera-
tions are not the priority for the precautionary principle.41  Because uncer-
tainties are a primary factor in precautionary decision-making,
calculations involving the precautionary principle are less quantifiable and
concrete than analyses using cost-benefit analysis.  The trigger of uncer-
tainty gives regulators “ample opportunity to invoke the precautionary
principle as justification for indefensible regulations” whenever there is
“some scientific indication of a threat to the ‘desired level’ of safety.”42
Unlike cost-benefit analysis, the precautionary principle has a much lower
threshold of proof for regulators to meet.43  Any concern regarding safety
or health can be sufficient to trigger precautionary regulations.
Criticisms of the precautionary principle center on the methodology’s
vagueness and possible over-regulatory effects.  The methodology’s lack of
concrete factors and decision-making based on the lack of information has
been described as problematic for the European Union, with suggestions
that the principle can be more easily abused to block new technologies.44
The Commission of the European Communities has unsuccessfully tried to
provide more guidance on operational formulations of the safety princi-
ple.45  Initial attempts at formulating an articulation of scientific uncer-
tainty have resulted in the determination that “Recourse to the
precautionary principle presupposes: identification of potentially negative
effects resulting from a phenomenon, product or process; a scientific evalu-
ation of the risk which because of the insufficiency of the data, their incon-
clusive or imprecise nature, makes it impossible to determine with
sufficient certainty the risk in question.”46 This articulation gives greater
guidance regarding the types of factors that justify the use of the precau-
tionary principle, but the precautionary decision-making process remains
more nebulous than cost-benefit analysis. Although the EU also uses cost-
benefit analysis, the principle is applied much more narrowly than in the
United States.  The Commission dictates that while precautionary deci-
sion-making must still “include a cost benefit analysis in order to reduce
the risk to a level acceptable to all concerned . . . it is not possible to quan-
tify adverse consequences . . . in exclusively financial terms or to assess
39. Id.
40. Cole, supra note 27. R
41. See Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety
Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 119 (2001).
42. Id. at 177.
43. Cole, supra note 27.
44. See Maurizio Iaccarino, A Cost/Benefit Analysis: About the Precautionary Principle,
11 EMBO REPORTS 454, 454 (2000).
45. Geistfeld, supra note 41, at 174.
46. Id. at 178.
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economic and moral impact purely on the basis of a cost-benefit analy-
sis.”47  The EU explicitly criticizes cost-benefit analysis, warning that “the
value of quantitative risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis schemes must
not be overrated. Nor must the figures involved be exaggerated.”48
Despite the differences between these two formative regulatory princi-
ples, some officials argue that these disparities will present fewer obstacles
than previously feared.  For example, U.S. Trade Representative Michael
Froman acknowledged that one of the challenges facing TTIP negotiations
is the “historical difference about the appropriate approach to regulation,
sometimes characterized as a so-called gap between Europe’s preference for
the precautionary principle and the United States’ focus on cost-benefit
analysis.”49  However, Froman also noted that the concern over this differ-
ence is “largely anachronistic” and that “while it might be premature to
declare an end to the debate over the precautionary principle and cost-
benefit analysis, that distinction is decreasingly important, at least in terms
of . . . T-TIP.”50  Froman notes that strict reliance on the distinction
between the two principles is an oversimplification of the United States
and European regulatory schemes; Froman acknowledges that the EU does
not only use the precautionary principle in regulatory decision-making,
and that the United States does take qualitative factors into account when
regulating.51
Other commentators suggest that while the regulatory divergences
cause differences in the regulation of particular products, the overall risk of
both systems is similar.  Twenty case studies and 3,000 observations of
risk-reducing decisions seem to show that treatment of risk is approxi-
mately the same, and the perception of highly disparate regulatory effects
may be caused by more heavily publicized risks.52  These observations
suggest that the regulatory principles may not be fundamentally irreconcil-
able.  Instead, the ways in which they are implemented may be a major
cause of regulatory divergence.
47. O.J., supra note 37, at 10.
48. Id. at 7.
49. U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, Remarks on the United States, the
European Union, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Sept. 30,
2013) (transcript available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/tran-
scripts/2013/september/froman-us-eu-ttip).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. JOHN F. MORRALL III, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ADVANCING TRANSATLANTIC
BUSINESS, DETERMINING COMPATIBLE REGULATORY REGIMES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EU
22 (2011), available at http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/partnerships/Cornerstone%20
Project/cornerstone_project_morrall.pdf.
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II. The Impacts of Regulatory Incoherence
A. Differences in Industry and Trade Regulation between the United
States and EU
The foundational regulatory principles of cost-benefit analysis and the
precautionary principle can lead to very significant divergences in regula-
tion.  While the general safety and health aims and regulations of the two
entities remain similar, other areas of regulation undergo different treat-
ment.  According to the Council on Foreign Relations, “In some cases, most
notably drug approval, European and American standards have con-
verged . . . . But over the last fifteen years, the EU has enacted a number of
health, safety, and environmental regulations which are more restrictive
than their American counterparts.”53  This shift, attributed to the increas-
ingly important role of the precautionary principle, has led to more strin-
gent regulations in areas related to public welfare.  Some of the most
significant divergences between the United States and the EU can be found
in regulations concerning the chemical industry, the food industry, and
the environment.  The United States has approved significantly more vari-
eties of genetically modified (GM) products than the EU, while also
allowing the use of hazardous chemicals.54  The EU ratified the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, requiring member states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while
the United States has only signed but has not ratified the treaty.55
1. The Chemical Industry
The EU requires registration of all chemicals sold in Europe.  The
United States, on the other hand, has much more relaxed requirements for
the chemical industry.56  Even though the United States and EU have simi-
lar goals with respect to public safety and protection, the industry impacts
of their regulations are quite disparate.  Both sides have comparably high
levels of protection, especially when compared with less regulated coun-
tries.  Compared to the United States, the EU regulates the manufacturing
of children’s products especially aggressively.57  Phthalates are chemical
compounds used to make plastics for a wide range of industrial applica-
tions.58  Phthalates can be found in medical supplies, electrical materials,
53. Diahanna Lynch & David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the
United States: A Case-Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 5, 2001), http://www.cfr.org/agricultural-policy/regulation-
gmos-europe-united-states-case-study-contemporary-european-regulatory-politics/
p8688.
54. VOGEL, supra note 24, at 1.
55. Id.
56. Daniela Vincenti, EU-US Trade Talks Delve into Regulatory Maze, EURACTIV (Sept.
26, 2013), http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-eu-us-trade-talks/eu-us-trade-talks-
delve-regulato-news-530682.
57. Efforts to Ban Phthalates, PBS NOW (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/now/
shows/412/ban-phthalates.html.
58. Maria E. Callapez, Presentation at the Proceedings of the 2nd ICESHS: The USA
and the EU: Two Perspectives on Phthalates (Cracow, Poland, Sept. 6– 9, 2006) (edited
transcript available at http://www.2iceshs.cyfronet.pl/2ICESHS_Proceedings/Chapter_
30/R-Varia_III_Callapez.pdf).
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clothing, toys, paints, adhesives, and even cosmetics.59  Public concern
over the use of phthalates in manufacturing began after findings of unac-
ceptable levels of leaching from baby teething rings.60  Since then, the EU
has also banned bisphenol A (BPA), a chemical with similar industrial uses
and potential health effects.61  Exposure to phthalates is potentially carci-
nogenic, while exposure to BPA can affect young immune systems.62  The
Commission argued that children are particularly susceptible to adverse
health effects from exposure to these compounds due to the possibility of
early developmental issues and the widespread use of the chemicals in chil-
dren’s products.63
Although preliminary studies regarding the safety of phthalates were
inconclusive, the EU issued Directive 2005/84/EC, a precautionary ban on
the use of phthalates in toys and children’s products.64  The Council stated
that “the use of certain phthalates in toys and childcare articles made of
plasticized material or including parts made of plasticized material should
be prohibited as the presence of certain phthalates presents or could poten-
tially present risks related to the health of children.”65  The Directive stated
that the precautionary principle should be applied to the use of phthalates
because children are particularly vulnerable to hazardous substances and
exposure should be reduced as much as possible.66  However, the Directive
expressly acknowledged that scientific information concerning the regu-
lated chemicals is either “lacking or conflictual, but it cannot be excluded
that they pose a potential risk.”67
The EU’s treatment of phthalates illustrates the application of the pre-
cautionary principle well.  Despite empirically inconclusive evidence con-
cerning the effects of phthalate exposure on human health, the EU took
immediate action to limit exposure.  The Directive had no discussion of
economic costs and benefits.  Instead, it focused only on the potential risk
to children and maximum reduction of exposure to phthalates.  Consistent
with the Council’s previous articulation of the substantive elements of the
precautionary principle, the Directive required that the regulatory mea-
sures based on the principle must be subject to review under any addi-
tional or newfound scientific information.
The United States, on the other hand, had a more moderate response
to the use of phthalates, and did not adopt the EU’s ban on phthalates in
the manufacture of children’s toys.  The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has expressed concern about phthalates and established an Action
Plan in 2012 to describe its plans for possibly identifying and regulating
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. EU Bans Bisphenol A Chemical from Babies’ Bottles, B.B.C. NEWS: EUROPE (Nov. 25,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11843820.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Council Directive 76/769, 2005 O.J. (L 344) 40 (EEC).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 41.
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phthalates.68  The report explicitly acknowledges the health concerns and
exposure risks of phthalates, noting “the well-characterized health effects
of phthalate exposure in animals in conjunction with the demonstrated
widespread phthalate exposure in children.”69  However, this regulatory
report was released nearly seven years after the EU’s ban.70  The EPA also
warned that the Action Plan is not a “final Agency determination or other
final Agency action.”71  Instead, the Action Plan dictated an intent to “lay
the groundwork to consider initiating . . . rulemaking”72 rather than a defi-
nite plan to regulate.  Furthermore, the EPA’s plan detailed cost considera-
tions,73 as well as possible ways in which to “encourage industry to move
away from phthalates in a non-regulatory setting to expand risk manage-
ment effects beyond whatever regulatory action might be taken under
TSCA or could be used as input to a regulatory action.”74
The EPA’s plan provides an excellent illustration of the American regu-
latory scheme.  Unlike the EU, the EPA has proceeded much more slowly
and deliberately in considering any possible phthalate regulations.  The
EPA explicitly acknowledged the potential health effects of exposure to
phthalates.  However, the risk of adverse health effects was not sufficient to
trigger regulatory action.  The EPA must first conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis and consider the economic costs and possible alternatives before even
an initial consideration of any regulation takes place, pursuant to Executive
Order 12866.
2. Regulation of GM products
Similarly, the United States and EU have widely divergent schemes for
regulating genetically modified (GM) products. GM products are exten-
sively used in the United States, while a de facto moratorium in the EU has
led to the approval of very few GM products.75  The basis for U.S. regula-
tion of GM products relies on the assumption that “GM plants, animal
feeds, and human foods are essentially similar to conventionally-bred
plants, feeds, and foods.”76  This assumption allows U.S. regulatory agen-
cies to treat GM products as substantially equivalent to conventionally pro-
duced products, permitting activities to proceed until any showing of
significant harm.77  The basis for EU regulation of GM products, on the
68. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PHTHALATES ACTION PLAN (2012) [here-
inafter ACTION PLAN].
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 11.
73. See id. at 4.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Kym Anderson & Lee Ann Jackson, Why Are US and EU Policies Toward GMOs So
Different?, 6 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 95, 95 (2003).
76. M.J. Peterson, The EU-US Dispute over Regulation of Genetically Modified Orga-
nisms, Plants, Feeds, and Foods— Case Summary, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS
EDUCATION IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING: CASE STUDY SERIES 1, 5 (2010), http://scho-
larworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=edethicsinscience.
77. Id.
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other hand, relies on the assumption that that there is a substantial differ-
ence between GM products and conventionally produced products.78  As a
result, producers of GM products in the EU must prove that their products
are safe before they can be sold.
One of the most salient differences in treatment of GM products
between the United States and the EU is the way in which food labels for
GM products are regulated.  In the United States, although the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) does regulate the release of genetically-modi-
fied organisms, the agency has no mandatory labeling requirement for
foods containing GM products.79  Instead, the FDA issued a nonbinding
guidance document that provides certain labeling recommendations to
producers of GM products.80  Although public perception of GM products
is generally negative, with over 90% of Americans favoring labeling, at least
70% of processed foods in the United States contain GM products.81  How-
ever, proponents of GM products argue that “the technology boosts yields,
reduces pesticide use and is a crucial tool in the struggle against global
hunger.  Americans have been munching GM food for two decades without
ill effect, and nearly all scientists believe that GM crops are safe.”82
Like the American approach to phthalates, American regulation of GM
products and foods arises out of the cost-benefit principle.  Scientific evi-
dence regarding the safety of GM products is inconclusive.  The World
Health Organization stated, “[I]ndividual GM foods and their safety should
be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that it is not possible to make gen-
eral statements on the safety of all GM foods.”83  With no immediate scien-
tific indication that GM products have any harmful effects, the cost-benefit
principle has “led to regulators’ perceived certainty that GM foods do not
pose significant risks, and that a narrow definition of risks connected with
GM foods is acceptable.”84  With economic benefits from the use of GM
products and little apparent risk, the cost-benefit principle as applied to
GM products favors looser regulations.
The EU’s position on labeling GM products is much stricter.  In a
Directive issued in 2001, the Council declared that the protection of
78. Id.
79. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABEL-
ING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEER-
ING; DRAFT GUIDANCE (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/Guidance
Regulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm0590
98.htm.
80. Id.
81. Warning Labels for Safe Stuff, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/united-states/21588898-one-way-or-another-labelling-gm-food-may-be-
coming-america-warning-labels-safe.
82. Id.
83. Food Safety: 20 Questions on Genetically Modified Foods, WORLD HEALTH ORGANI-
ZATION, http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/20questions/en (last vis-
ited May 13, 2014).
84. Celina Ramjoue´, A review of regulatory issues raised by genetically modified orga-
nisms in agriculture, CAB REVIEWS: PERSPECTIVES IN AGRICULTURE, VETERINARY SCIENCE,
NUTRITION AND NATURAL RESOURCES 6 (2008), available at http://www.princeton.edu/
morefoodlesscarbon/reading/files/Ramjoue-Review-of-Reg-Issues.pdf.
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human health and the environment required the application of the precau-
tionary principle to the regulation of GM products.85  The Directive
required that GM products must be clearly labeled or documented with the
words: “This product contains genetically modified organisms.”86  The
Directive also required the establishment of monitoring procedures and
pre-release notification to a national competent authority.87  A subsequent
EU Directive issued in 2003 required maximum limits on trace amounts of
GM products in foods before they could be labeled “GMO-free.”88  This
new requirement limited trace amounts of GM products to 0.9% for author-
ized products and 0.5% for products that have not yet been approved by the
Commission.89  After a three-year period, the threshold was reduced to zero
for several varieties of ingredients, which caused “extreme difficulty of sep-
arating out different varieties of grain in bulk shipment and the continuing
stalemate on approval of GM varieties in the EU Council.”90
The EU’s position on GM products assumes that the lack of scientific
knowledge and certainty regarding the safety of GM products indicates
that they are hazardous or detrimental to health.  As a result, the applica-
tion of the precautionary principle was appropriate given this assumption
and required the EU to strictly regulate GM products.  The EU’s regulatory
policy towards GM products is a product of its broader definition of risks.
The EU includes delayed effects on health and the environment and social
and ethical issues as part of its regulatory decision-making process.91  In
utilizing the precautionary principle, the EU considers both normative and
scientific definitions of the level of acceptable risk.92  Economic concerns
are mentioned only within the context of requiring industry participants to
notify regulatory bodies before release of GM products.93  The Council
does not even appear to consider economic costs in its Directive.94
3. The Environment
Environmental regulations provide another example of a controversial
difference between the United States and the EU.  One of the more visible
examples of the disparities between the two entities regarding environmen-
tal policy is found in their treatment of the Kyoto Protocol, which is an
international agreement committing its parties to meet binding emission
reduction targets.95  The United States is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol,
85. Council Directive 90/220, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Council
Directive].
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id.
88. Peterson, supra note 76, at 14. R
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Ramjoue´, supra note 84, at 6.
92. Id.
93. Council Directive, supra note 85, at 9. R
94. See id.
95. Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited May 13, 2014).
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but has refused to ratify the treaty.96  President George W. Bush explained
that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol would have detrimental effects on the
United States economy.97  The United States’ reluctance to ratify the Proto-
col was based on cost-benefit decision-making: the short-term economic
costs do not justify the benefits for the United States, despite its acknowl-
edgment of the long-term pitfalls of climate change through signing the
agreement.98  The EU, on the other hand, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in
2002, which was then entered into force in 2005.99  The EU has expressly
declared that “preventing dangerous climate change is a strategic priority
for the European Union.”100  The European position on climate change is
consistent with the precautionary principle.  The EU recognizes the cost of
implementing climate change programs, but values the reduction in risk
more highly than the pure economic costs.
B. The Estimated Cost Impact of Non-Tariff Barriers Caused by
Disparate Regulations
The differences between U.S. and EU regulations cause significant bar-
riers to trade.  Some of the major benefits from the TTIP will be realized
from the reduction of barriers to trade between the United States and EU.
Transatlantic trade is already fairly free; there are few and low tariffs
between the two economic entities.101  The average tariff of transatlantic
trade is under 3%.102  In comparison, China’s overall average applied tariff
rate is 9.6%, with some categories as high as 25% on passenger vehicles
and 15.6% on agricultural products.103  Although eliminating these tariffs
as planned will still result in considerable economic benefits, the already
low average tariff rate will not provide the largest gains from the TTIP.
Instead, most of the potential economic benefits will come from the elimi-
nation and reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade.104
NTBs are approximately one order of magnitude more significant than
the costs of tariff duties; U.S. companies have additional costs of over 50%
when exporting alcohol and tobacco to the United States, while chemical
companies in the EU have additional costs of 112%.105  The disparities
96. Paul Reynolds, Kyoto: Why Did the U.S. Pull Out?, B.B.C. NEWS (Mar. 30, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1248757.stm.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, (Feb. 16, 2005), http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratifica-
tion/items/2613.php.
100. What is the EU Doing About Climate Change?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: CLIMATE
ACTION (Nov. 19, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu.
101. THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1.
102. Trade Policy: United States, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov. 19, 2013), http://ec.
europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states.
103. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES
12 (2013).
104. See Felbermyer & Larch, supra note 4, at 53.
105. Id.
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caused by NTBs are much more asymmetrical than tariffs.106  Therefore,
reducing NTBs will reduce many of the costs associated with transatlantic
trade. Disparate regulatory schemes are one of the primary causes of NTBs.
The differences between the regulations described earlier create substantial
inefficiencies and excess costs. If TTIP negotiations can achieve regulatory
coherence, some of the regulated areas that are expected to yield the most
economic gains are the automotive industry and the chemical and pharma-
ceutical industries.  This section will focus on the estimated cost impact of
NTBs on these industries and regulated areas.
The principle method of reducing NTBs is to promote regulatory
coherence by reconciling the two disparate regulatory schemes.  The
United States-European Union High Level Working Group on Jobs and
Growth (HLWG) noted:
Both sides agree on the importance of putting processes and mechanisms in
place to reduce costs associated with regulatory differences by promoting
greater compatibility, including, where appropriate, harmonization of future
regulations, and to resolve concerns and reduce burdens arising from
existing regulations through equivalence, mutual recognition, or other
agreed means, as appropriate.107
As a result, the HLWG has focused on the elimination or reduction of both
conventional and non-conventional barriers to trade.  The HLWG also rec-
ognizes the importance of regulatory schemes in the development of trade
negotiations, stating a focus on enhancing the compatibility of regulations
and standards.108
Some NTB sources that are not related to safety and public health con-
cerns may be the best candidates for regulatory coherence that will main-
tain current safety standards while reducing trade costs.  For example, the
United States and EU use different crash test dummies for certain crash
tests but not others.109  The use of different testing products can lead to
significant costs, especially in industries, such as the automotive industry,
that are dependent upon economies of scale.110  Industry practices aimed
at achieving economies of scale reduce production costs and inefficiencies.
However, these practices may be deterred by divergent regulatory require-
ments and test procedures.111  Harmonizing these regulatory require-
ments, especially in regulations unrelated to health and public safety, can
substantially increase the ability of businesses to achieve economies of
scale and incur significant cost savings.
106. Id.
107. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HIGH LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON JOBS AND GROWTH 3– 4
(2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_1505
19.pdf.
108. Id. at 1.
109. MORRALL, supra note 52, at 23.
110. JOSEPH FRANCOIS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH, REDUCING TRANSATLAN-
TIC BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 23 (2013), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf.
111. MORRALL, supra note 52, at 23.
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An initial determination of cost savings can be calculated by creating
an NTB index of an industry.  An NTB index gives some indication of the
extent of costs imposed by NTBs, as well as the relative levels of regulation
among different agencies.112  An NTB index ranges from 0– 100, where 0
indicates no NTBs of any type, or completely free trade, and where 100
indicates prohibitively high NTBs, such that the amount of NTBs prevents
trade completely by increasing costs or restricting market access.113  The
industries that have the largest disparities in NTB indices include the auto-
motive, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries.114  Reducing NTBs in
these industries will liberalize transatlantic trade by eliminating “different
approaches to the same regulatory challenges” that have “the unintended
consequence of increasing costs for firms, which have to comply with two
regulatory environments, dragging down productivity.”115  Despite the
considerable significance of tariff costs in these industries, limiting tariffs
would lead to “much more limited, though positive effects.”116  Instead,
negotiating NTBs “provides the opportunity to pursue a mix of cross-recog-
nition and regulatory convergence to reduce these barriers.”117
NTBs can be difficult to measure and evaluate because they rely on
many different factors, including legal requirements, firm business deci-
sions, and consumer influences.  Estimates obtained from the EU’s Eco-
nomic Assessment examined firm surveys to evaluate general openness of
market industries, as well as gravity-based econometrics to estimate per-
cent price impacts of variations in NTB levels.118  This research reveals
significant differences resulting between exports and imports, individual
industries, and origins (whether EU or U.S. origin).119  Transatlantic NTBs
are also substantially lower in service industries as opposed to industries
that produce goods.120  As a result, it appears that some of the greatest
gains from TTIP can be found from reducing NTBs in industries focused
on goods.121  However, many barriers to removing NTBs may be difficult
to overcome.  Some NTBs result from consumer preferences, language,
geography, political considerations, and legal systems.122  Some of these
barriers, such as consumer preferences and geography, can be much more
influential when dealing with goods-related industries.
One of the most visible NTB sources is in the automotive industry.
Despite the significance of NTBs, however, tariffs still have considerable
cost impact on the industry. U.S. import tariffs range from 2.5% for
importing cars to the United States to 25% for importing pickup trucks
112. Francois, supra note 110, at 16– 17. R
113. Id.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id at 2– 3.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id. at 17.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id. at 19.
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and commercial vans.123  The EU, on the other hand, charges a flat rate of
10% on imported automobiles, regardless of the type of vehicle.124
Sources of NTBs in the industry include differences in safety testing, emis-
sions standards, and divergent regulations for the heights and widths of
headrests.125  The perceived NTB index of EU exports to the U.S is 34.8,
while the perceived NTB index of U.S. exports to the EU is 31.6.126  These
index estimates are relatively low compared to those present in some other
industries such as food, beverage, and medical supplies, but are readily
identifiable even at the consumer level.127  Differences between require-
ments for regulatory compliance and other NTBs can have significant
impacts on manufacturing costs, consumer choice, and industry
performance.
The automotive industry is highly focused on consumer preferences.
Jim Farley, an executive with Ford Motor Co., says, “There is no more
important topic for our industry, in terms of the revenue for different com-
panies, than [brand] loyalty.”128  Ensuring consumer access to the broadest
possible lineup for consumers is an important goal for automakers, but
disparate regulations often made this goal difficult to achieve.129  Even
vehicles designed for transnational appeal may be manufactured differently
in order to accommodate regulatory differences.  The Ford Fusion/
Mondeo, for example, is supposed to represent Ford’s “One Ford” philoso-
phy; however, the global parts commonality for this model is only 80%,
which is already higher than the industry standard.130
Designing cars to meet safety and environment standards in various
jurisdictions is extremely costly.  Cars imported into the United States
must meet National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) guide-
lines, whereas cars imported into the EU must meet the European New Car
Assessment Programme (NCAP).131  The NHTSA guidelines and the NCAP
have different protocols, methods, and priorities.132  However, the general
safety standards of the United States and EU are fairly similar.  Safety and
environmental regulations in the EU “have caught up with U.S. standards
over the past 15 years. And because of new rules passed by the Obama
administration, U.S. rules on fuel efficiency and emissions have nearly
123. Justin Berkowitz, Free-Trade Cars: Why a U.S.-Europe Free-Trade Agreement is a
Good Idea, CAR AND DRIVER (June 2013), http://www.caranddriver.com/features/free-
trade-cars-why-a-useurope-free-trade-agreement-is-a-good-idea-feature.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Francois, supra note 110, at 18. R
127. Id.
128. Joseph B. White, How Auto Makers Keep You Coming Back, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873246244045
78257703957447498.
129. Berkowitz, supra note 123. R
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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caught up with European standards.”133  Despite the similarities between
overall levels of safety and environmental impact, automakers must still
adhere to the often duplicative requirements imposed by the United States
and EU regulatory bodies.  Mutual recognition of test standards will not
only decrease manufacturer costs, but also may give consumers greater
options in their vehicle choices by increasing the range of vehicles in the
national market and making more individual vehicle options available.134
Decreased costs of production, distribution, and regulatory compli-
ance could lead to increased manufacturing, broader product lineups for
consumers, and even the resurgence of some previously unavailable brands
in the United States135  Despite the relatively low NTB index for the auto-
motive industry, the potential market access impact ranking for the indus-
try is estimated to be the highest out of all industries evaluated.136  The
automotive industry will likely dominate in terms of impact as a result of
high elasticities of demand and high trade barriers.137  Additionally, the
reduction of NTBs in the automotive industry is expected to result in a very
strong expansion of the EU motor vehicle sector.138  In the most ambitious
forecast, total trade will increase by 43.11%.139  Trade between the United
States and EU in the industry should experience a substantial expansion
as a result of “relatively deep changes in the integration of the transatlantic
motor vehicle sector.”140  Much of this integration will result from the rela-
tively large differences in parts and components, but will also result from
the expected high reductions in tariffs for the sector.141
The sector with the next-highest potential market access impact as a
result of TTIP is comprised of the chemicals and pharmaceuticals indus-
tries.142  The sector has regulatory issues similar to those seen in automo-
tive trade between the EU and the United States: chemicals are regulated
according to certain tests and guidelines that can be duplicative or redun-
dant.143  The chemical sector is “similar, in terms of the pattern of results,
to motor vehicles.”144  Regulatory guidance and reconciliation will intro-
duce efficiencies in safety standards, development, research, and mutual
recognition.  As the pharmaceutical trade currently functions, the NTB
133. Matthew Dalton, U.S.-EU Trade Talks Aim at Barriers, not Tariffs, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Nov. 10, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230
4868404579189731322530204.
134. Berkowitz, supra note 123. R
135. Francois, supra note 110, at 32. R
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 62.
139. Id. at 65.
140. Id. at 70.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 32.
143. EFPIA & PHRMA, EU-U.S. HIGH LEVEL REGULATORY COOPERATION FORUM: TTIP—
AN OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE REGULATORY COMPATIBILITY IN THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL SEC-
TOR 7– 8 (2013), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/grc/
PhRMA_0.pdf [hereinafter BIOPHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR].
144. Francois, supra note 110, at 62. R
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index of EU exports to the United States is 23.8, while the NTB index of
U.S. exports to the EU is 44.7; EU exports of chemicals to the United States
have an index of 45.8, while U.S. exports to the EU have an index of
53.2.145  Like the automotive industry, these index figures are not the high-
est among all industries affected by TTIP; however, many of the NTBs in
the chemical industry are caused by regulatory incompatibility that could,
theoretically, be harmonized for cost savings.146
An estimated 80% of the potential gains from reducing NTBs in the
pharmaceutical industry are expected to come from cutting costs related to
unnecessary regulatory redundancy and trade restrictions.147  Some mea-
sures suggested by the International Conference on Harmonization
include the acceptance of a rationalized preclinical animal study system,
standardized safety updates and reporting throughout drug development,
common guidelines for reporting safety and efficacy data, and consoli-
dated reporting of new pharmaceutical candidates through common elec-
tronic documents.148
Transatlantic trade in biopharmaceuticals is currently regulated by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States and the Euro-
pean Medicines Agency (EMA) in the EU.149  Similar to the automotive
industry, both of these regulatory agencies have established practices and
inspections for acceptance of regulated goods.  However, also similar to the
automotive industry, these regulatory agencies are driven by similar safety
objectives regarding the identification, monitoring, and minimization of
risks to patient safety.150  The European Commission recognized the need
for creating a coherent regulatory scheme out of this common safety stan-
dard but divergent regulation, stating that “if the regulators could agree to
coordinate their safety assessments of the same chemicals-assessing the
same products at the same time and exchanging information-companies
wouldn’t have to repeat some tests.  This would save costs for both the
companies and the regulators, who have to evaluate the tests.”151
The cost impacts of regulatory incoherence, and the benefits of any
harmonization scheme, are considerable.  The automotive, chemical, and
pharmaceutical industries are two of the industries that have the most to
gain from trade liberalization.  75% of the total potential gain from regula-
tory coherence is estimated to come from four industries alone: motor vehi-
cles (31%), chemicals, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals (19%), food and
145. Id. at 18.
146. BIOPHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR, supra note 143 at 7. R
147. Id. at 6.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Yvonne Lis, A Comparison of U.S. Food and Drug Administration and European
Medicines Agency Regulations for Pharmaceutical Risk Management: Report of the Interna-
tional Society for Pharmacoeconomic and Outcomes Research Risk Management Working
Group 10, 12 ISPOR CONNECTIONS (Sept./Oct. 2011), http://www.ispor.org/sigs/
riskbenefitmanagement/A-comparison-of-US-Food-and-Drug-Administration-and-Euro-
pean-Medicines-Agency.pdf.
151. THE REGULATORY PART, supra note 12, at 3.
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beverages (14%), and electrical machinery (11%).152  The potential gains
from harmonizing the differing standards between the automotive indus-
tries in the EU and the United States are not surprising, as the industry is a
large contributor both to the economies of the EU and the United States
and to transatlantic trade between the two economies.153  A successful reg-
ulatory coherence scheme for the automotive industry, even taking into
account NTBs that cannot be overcome, is estimated to have a potential
transatlantic welfare gain of 15 billion U.S. dollars.154  Compared to the
sum of 53 billion U.S. dollars of bilateral trade in this sector in 2007, this
welfare gain indicates the significant cost impact of NTBs in this industry.
In the pharmaceuticals and chemical industries, EU NTBs caused about
15% of pharmaceutical trade costs, whereas U.S. NTBs caused approxi-
mately 10%.155  Although trade costs may only represent a relatively small
amount of cost savings to society, successful harmonization of some of the
regulatory NTBs in these industries can still lead to gains of 3 billion U.S.
dollars.156
The considerable economic benefits of TTIP come mostly from holis-
tic trade liberalization, rather than sole reliance on tariff elimination.  TTIP
should result in positive gains for both the EU and the United States even if
only tariff barriers to trade were reduced.157  Under a tariff-only liberaliza-
tion scheme, the gains would only amount to approximately 32 billion U.S.
dollars increase in GDP for the EU and 12 billion U.S. dollars increase in
GDP for the United States.158  On the other hand, reducing NTBs can lead
to estimated GDP increases of 92 to 162 billion U.S. dollars for the EU and
68 to 129 billion U.S. dollars for the United States.159  NTBs are a critical
source of increased costs of transatlantic trade that are also essential talk-
ing points for a successful trade agreement.
III. The Externalities  of the TTIP and a Regulatory Coherence
Scheme
The scope of TTIP and its effects on nearly all aspects of transatlantic
trade will inherently create many externalities affecting third-party nations
and consumers.  TTIP will have considerable effects on third-party coun-
tries in addition to the costs and trade liberalization impacts on transatlan-
tic commerce alone.  Reducing or eliminating tariffs can have harmful
effects on third-party nations, with particularly harmful effects for develop-
ing nations.160  These harmful effects are mainly caused by intensified
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competition in the EU and U.S. markets following the reduction of tariff
barriers.161  Reducing NTBs will primarily help trade with some third-
party countries, although developing countries may be disproportionately
harmed because they are primarily supply raw resources.162  Critics of
TTIP argue that the agreement will diminish the value of bilateral agree-
ments with third-party countries, as these countries would be confronted
with the increased European competition on the American market.163
A second effect of TTIP on third-party countries will be on costs and
income.164  However, the distinction between tariffs and NTBs is impor-
tant here.165  Tariffs have an income redistribution function by shifting
income from the consumer to the producer.166  Tariffs can also harm mar-
kets by distorting consumption and production decisions.167  NTBs, unlike
tariffs, do not affect third-party countries by redistributing income.168
Instead, NTBs generate direct economic costs by requiring producers to
make products fit for a certain market and regulatory scheme.169  Reduc-
ing NTBs, along with tariff barriers, has a potentially substantial and posi-
tive impact on the rest of the world— worldwide trade can experience
growth of up to 99 billion euros.170  Firms and third markets will likely
experience reduced costs as a result of better standard establishment and
recognition, reduced regulatory divergence, and reduced cost impacts of
regulatory schemes on the costs of business.171  NTB reduction in transat-
lantic trade will assist third-party nations by allowing them to minimize
harmful trade diversion effects caused by previously prohibitive regulatory
schemes.172
Another potential externality caused by TTIP is the “race to the bot-
tom” feared by critics of the agreement.  While working towards a unified
regulatory scheme necessarily risks compromising current standards, reg-
ulatory coherence does not necessarily entail lowered standards of protec-
tion.  The United States and the EU argue that TTIP negotiations will not
lower standards in order to suit business interests for three reasons: first,
regulators themselves will be participating in the negotiations; second, all
interested parties will be briefed and consulted; and third, inherent checks
and balances through the political structure of both entities will provide
oversight— both the European Parliament and the United States Congress
(2013), available at http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIP-GED%20study%2017
June%202013.pdf [hereinafter BENEFITS].
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must approve the final result.173  Despite these reassurances, the harmoni-
zation of extremely divergent regulations risks compromising standards of
protection or causing costly NTBs to remain.  The second round of negotia-
tions ended with a general acknowledgment of the importance of regula-
tory coherence in a press release issued by the Commission:
On regulatory issues, both sides agreed on the importance of horizontal
rules and specific commitments in sectors. Negotiators, including regulatory
experts, had a solid discussion on regulatory coherence and on possible ele-
ments for a chapter on technical barriers to trade going beyond WTO disci-
plines (so-called ‘TBT plus’).
Similarly, the third round of negotiations ended with renewed emphasis
from participants that “neither side intended to lower its high standards of
consumer, environment, health, labor or data protection, or limit its auton-
omy in setting regulations.”174  Regulatory coherence remains one of the
major goals of the negotiations.  Critics of the negotiations, however, argue
that these horizontal rules and sector commitments are unnecessary and
risk compromising standards for health, safety, and the environment.  One
critic, Erich Pica, argues, “Tariffs are already low and the exchange of
goods and services [between the United States and EU] is robust . . . TTIP
risks being a partnership of those who seek to prevent and roll back demo-
cratically agreed safeguards such as food and chemical safety, agriculture
and energy.”175
Other critics are concerned that TTIP is primarily catering to industry
and its lobby groups; the Corporate Europe Observatory revealed that the
commission has held 119 meetings with corporations and their lobbyists,
in contrast to only eight meetings with civil society groups.176  Addition-
ally, meetings with corporate interest groups have been closed to the public
and have not been disclosed online.177  Critics also point to promises of
economic and job growth from previous trade agreements, such as the
United States– Korea Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, that have not materialized.  Both of these agreements
were accompanied by a loss in the number of jobs, and U.S. exports fell by
3.5 billion dollars after the United States– Korea agreement.178
As TTIP negotiations are still ongoing, third party effects and deregu-
latory concerns will continue to put pressure on trade talks. Erik Brattberg
wrote,
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As negotiations enter into the next phase, pressure from environmental
groups, labor unions and consumer advocates will also increasingly be felt.
Many of these groups have recently stepped up their criticism of TTIP. While
this debate is of course essential, it also puts a heavier burden on propo-
nents of the trade deal to explain TTIP’s potential benefits and debunk skep-
tic’s criticisms.179
These issues will likely influence the extent of significant regulatory com-
promise from both the EU and the United States.  Some of the safety and
health standards can easily be reconciled through standardized procedures
and mutual recognition.  More divergent standards with fundamentally
divergent priorities and value assessments, however, may require either reg-
ulatory compromise or avoidance in the agreement.  The costs of removing
some NTBs may simply be too high, whether due to insufficient economic
benefits (such as the Kyoto Protocol situation), or due to political sensitivi-
ties.180  Consequently, some of the more contentious divergences between
the United States and the EU regulatory schemes will likely see either the
most or the least amount of retooling in order to finalize the trade
agreement.181
IV. Reconciliation of the Cost-benefit and Precautionary Principles
The significant differences between the regulatory principles of the EU
and the United States lead to substantial cost impacts upon transatlantic
trade.  While these costs are results of fundamentally different regulatory
schemes, cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle are not nec-
essary rivals or substitute methods for making regulatory and deregulatory
decisions.182  In fact, cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle
can be reconciled by assigning greater weights to societal health and safety
concerns within a cost-benefit analysis framework.  Incorporating quantita-
tive values for societal health and safety into cost-benefit analysis allows
the use of both schemes to create coherent regulations.183
A modified cost-benefit analysis that incorporates safety interests sat-
isfies both economic and social welfare concerns.  The economic desire for
scientific rigor and cost impacts is satisfied by using social welfare con-
cerns along with traditional risk, cost, and gain variables.  The precaution-
ary desire for maintaining social welfare standards is satisfied by
prioritizing strong safety and health standards over other variables.  The
cost-benefit analysis can specify a high level of risk-aversion within cost-
benefit analysis using an adjusted Ramsey equation, which combines valu-
ations of the social discount rate, pure rate of time preference, base-case
coefficient of relative risk-aversion, and expected rate of growth in per capi-
179. Erik Brattberg, Is 2014 the Transatlantic Trade Deal’s ‘Make-or-Break’ Year?, HUFF
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tal consumption.184  Daniel Cole argues that this calculation can mimic
the precautionary principle by reflecting relatively high risk-aversion
rather than risk-neutrality.185  This regulatory approach allows legal deci-
sion-makers to “employ cost-benefit methodology to formulate health and
safety regulations while still respecting the principle that safety matters
more than money.”186
Not only can incorporating the risk-aversion of the precautionary
principle achieve the fundamental goals of both regulatory principles, the
calculations can also be modified according to different policies.  Regula-
tory policies designed to tolerate routine risk can have a more risk-neutral,
economically traditional cost-benefit analysis.187  Policies that may impli-
cate substantially greater or intolerable risks, such as existential threats
and irreversible impacts upon unique goods, can build in higher levels of
risk-aversion to the cost-benefit analysis.188  This sliding-scale approach to
tolerating risk within cost-benefit analysis is consistent with the fundamen-
tal goals behind the cost-benefit and precautionary principles, as well as
the EU’s approach to applying these principles: tolerable risks can be
addressed using cost-benefit analysis, while more intolerable or unknown
risks should be addressed with greater risk-aversion under the precaution-
ary principle.189
Mark Geistfeld agreed with the general incorporation of risk factors
into cost-benefit analysis while also noting the distributive implications of
modified cost-benefit analysis.  He wrote, “[Cost-benefit analysis] modified
in this manner is more beneficial to potential victims, and consequently
more distributively fair, than conventional cost-benefit outcomes.  Moreo-
ver, modified [cost-benefit analysis] is not unfair to potential injurers.”190
Modified cost-benefit analysis, then, is more beneficial to the parties
helped by regulation than pure cost-benefit analysis.  The modified princi-
ple is also potentially less unfair to the parties being regulated, as opposed
to the sweeping regulations under the precautionary principle.
Additionally, a reworked cost-benefit analysis incorporating precau-
tionary factors is not necessarily required for some aspects of the trade
negotiations.  Regulatory convergence can also be achieved through mutual
recognition of existing, substantively compatible regulations.  Many
existing regulations can actually be reconciled with procedural means,
rather than resorting to a reformulation of substantive safety standards.
The best examples of these potential sources of regulatory coherence come
from the automotive and pharmaceutical industries.  The United States and
EU have similar general safety goals in regulating both industries, but thus
far have regulated these industries using different methods to achieve these
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goals.  Recognizing convergent regulations will prevent the need to create
new regulations that could be counterproductive or less rigorous.
In the automotive industry, the actual substantive safety standards of
U.S. and European regulations are “generally functionally equivalent and
produce similar levels of safety.”191  Automakers generally try to build
vehicles that will satisfy requirements for both jurisdictions, but must still
engineer vehicles to market specifications.192  Designing cars to meet spe-
cific regulations can be inefficient and costly, especially when the regula-
tions have the same substantive safety standards but divergent procedures.
European crash tests require compliance with pedestrian impact, whiplash,
and infant protection standards.193  NHTSA requires these tests as well, but
performance in the tests themselves is not scored.194  Reductions of these
types of redundancies account for 31% of the total benefits estimated from
reducing NTBs in the automotive trade.195  Additional procedural diver-
gences include the EU’s ex ante gatekeeper type approval of automobiles,
whereas the United States uses ex post enforcement and self-certifica-
tion.196  Based on these procedural differences, mutual recognition of the
substantive similarities and high levels of overall safety standards between
these regulatory regimes will encourage reduction of NTBs, decrease costs,
and liberalize automotive trade.
Similarly, the pharmaceutical and chemical industry standards of the
United States and EU are substantively comparable.197  The process for
approving new drugs is similar in both jurisdictions, although the EU does
have two added steps to evaluate cost-effectiveness and member state pric-
ing.198  A study by the International Society for Pharmacoeconomic and
Outcomes Research Risk Management Working Group found that the FDA
and EMA have similar data needs, objectives for identification, monitoring,
and minimization of risk, and evaluation components.199  One of the most
important and divergent regulatory issues for U.S. exports is not a safety
regulation: the EU regulates pricing policies, while the United States does
not.200  Mutual recognition of the many overlapping regulatory measures
of the United States and EU could decrease or eliminate NTBs without
compromising regulatory goals and safety standards.
For the divergent regulatory practices responsible for large amounts of
NTBs, the United States and EU could either employ a modified cost-bene-
fit analysis or mutually recognize substantively comparable, existing stan-
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dards.  Cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle are not
necessarily incompatible regulatory principles.  While their practical appli-
cation by the United States and EU can often result in disparate regulatory
schemes, the differences between the schemes are often matters of proce-
dure and methodology.  Many of the divergences in regulation can be rec-
onciled through mutual recognition without compromising the safety
standards and regulatory goals that critics of TTIP want to uphold.  Simi-
larly, even vastly disparate schemes can achieve coherence through a modi-
fied cost-benefit analysis that incorporates the economic considerations of
pure cost-benefit analysis and the risk-aversion of the precautionary princi-
ple.  The modified cost-benefit analysis approach to regulatory coherence
retains the decision-making employed by both the United States and the
EU on policies with tolerable risks, while adding a layer of risk-aversive
safety for less tolerable risks.  Applying modified-cost benefit analysis to
regulatory divergence can decrease NTBs and increase trade gains by rec-
onciling the two principles of cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary
principle.
Conclusion
Achieving regulatory coherence, one of the primary goals of the TTIP,
requires an understanding of the foundational regulatory principles of the
United States and the EU.  These foundational principles account for some
of the disparities between the respective regulatory schemes of the United
States and the EU, as well as the costs of any trade relationship that must
navigate these regulatory schemes.  These disparities are responsible for
significant costs and barriers to transatlantic trade, and also influence
trade with third-party nations.  Regulatory disparities impacting trade,
known as NTBs, are one of the most important sources of cost savings and
potential gains from TTIP.  Reducing NTBs, along with tariff barriers to
trade, will decrease costs for industries and lead to significant GDP gains
for both the United States and the EU.
Successful regulatory coherence and reduction of NTBs must involve
reconciliation of regulatory schemes.  The United States and the EU regu-
late based on cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle, respec-
tively.  These principles are often applied with disparate results.  The EU
has very strict regulations on many products and industries, including
chemicals, environmental standards, and food products.  The United
States, on the other hand, bases regulatory decisions on economic and sci-
entific factors.  While the United States regulatory scheme can be
described as under-regulating, the European regulatory scheme is often
described as over-regulating.
Despite these fundamental and practical differences, the United States
and European regulatory schemes can be reconciled.  Although the cost-
benefit principle and the precautionary principle seem highly divergent in
methodology and outcome, the two principles can be incorporated into a
modified cost-benefit analysis to create regulatory coherence.  Modified
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cost-benefit analysis retains the traditional aspects of pure cost-benefit
analysis for more tolerable, routine risks.  However, when more intolerable,
unknown, or especially dangerous risks are possible, modified cost-benefit
analysis builds risk-aversion into the analysis.  Risk-aversion calculations
can approximate the behavior of the precautionary principle, allowing reg-
ulators to use the economically preferred cost-benefit principle while also
valuing safety at a higher level.  Modified cost-benefit analysis will retain
the United States focus on economic considerations for more risk-neutral
policies and provide further precautionary protections with more risk-
averse regulatory policies.
Even though modified cost-benefit analysis is a workable way to create
regulatory coherence, using this principle is not necessary in all aspects of
the trade negotiations between the United States and the EU.  Some
existing regulations, especially in the automotive and pharmaceutical
industries, are already compatible substantively.  The regulatory schemes
can diverge on procedural and methodological grounds, which can create
costly redundancies that restrict trade.  Identifying and reducing the NTBs
caused by substantively similar regulations can lead to trade gains and
other benefits without compromising on any safety standards or regulatory
goals.
The biggest obstacle facing TTIP negotiators is the reduction of NTBs
in transatlantic trade without compromising safety standards.  While elimi-
nating or reducing tariff barriers to trade will also create gains, the benefits
from reducing NTBs are far greater than those incurred from reducing the
already low tariffs between the United States and the EU.  These NTBs,
which mostly consist of regulatory divergences between the United States
and the EU, have large cost impacts that can lead to billions of U.S. dollars
of potential gains upon elimination or reduction of the NTBs.  Reducing
NTBs requires U.S. and EU trade negotiators to acknowledge regulatory
divergence and redundancy while simultaneously working towards regula-
tory coherence.  In order for TTIP to have the maximum possible gains and
benefits, the United States and EU must apply mutual recognition to sub-
stantively similar regulations or reconcile existing regulations to work
towards regulatory coherence.  If regulations cannot be mutually recog-
nized for substantive compatibility, then the best way to achieve regulatory
coherence in TTIP negotiations is to apply a modified cost-benefit analysis
that reconciles pure cost-benefit analysis with the precautionary principle.
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